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"FACTS" MISREPRESENTED BY CRUISERS FROM THE RECORD
Cruisers Yachts, the Appellee, in its submitted brief, presented a section entitled
"FACTS" (Cruisers Brief Pg. 5-8) which contained several misrepresentations or
mischaracterizations of the Record upon which it based its Argument. As several of
these misrepresentations potentially play a pivotal role in responding to the Brief, they
are addressed here as follows:
1.

(Cruisers Brief Pg. 5) - Cruisers asserts that, "Sales personnel at Wasatch

Marine told Mr. Boudofthe manufacturer's limited warranty" claiming that this
statement is supported by Pages 275-276 of the Record.
Correct Record Statement (A Direct Contradiction):
"During negotiations preceding Plaintiffs December 23, 1998,
agreement to purchase the yacht, and as an inducement to Plaintiff to
purchase the yacht, Defendant Wasatch Marine, through Stuart Nelson,
represented to Plaintiff that the yacht was covered under a comprehensive
warranty by Defendant Cruisers Yachts, the manufacturer, and by
Defendant Wasatch Marine for a period of at least one year with certain
components, such as the hull, being covered for a more extensive period of
time.
At no time preceding Plaintiffs December 23, 1998, agreement to
purchase the yacht, did Defendant Wasatch Marine or Defendant Cruisers
Yachts show Plaintiff or the Boud family any of the warranty
documentation or reference that the warranty was exclusive in nature or
limited (other than the length of time of the coverage represented to
Plaintiff as previously detailed)."
(Record Page 275). Plaintiff was told the manufacturer's warranty was "comprehensive"
and was not told that any such warranty was exclusive in nature or limited.
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2.

(Cruisers Brief Pg. 5) - Cruisers asserts that, "The trial court found that

Mr. Boud had read the brochure before he agreed to buy the boat from Wasatch Marine"
claiming that this statement is supported by Page 446 of the Record (Final Order).
Correct Record Statement (Corrects an Inaccurate and Misleading Claim):
The Final Order referenced by Cruisers in fact stated that the Court found, 'for
purposes of Cruiser's motion, that the Plaintiff read the referenced portion of the sales
brochure [Page 30] prior to his purchase of the subject model 3375 boat" The Court
never found that Plaintiff read the entire sales brochure or that Plaintiff ever noticed the
reference to a Limited Warranty buried on the back cover in extremely small print. The
record, as set forth in the preceding correction of fact clearly contradicts any such
assertion.
3.

(Cruisers Brief Pg, 6) - Cruisers asserts that, "When the yacht arrived,

Boud apparently waived his prior testing condition by making payment in full before
taking delivery of the yacht" claiming that this statement is supported by Page 278 of the
Record.
Correct Record Statement (Corrects an Inaccurate and Misleading Claim):
There is no indication anywhere in the Record that Plaintiff actually took
"delivery" of the yacht [Plaintiff has claimed Rejection of the yacht and that any
"delivery" of the yacht to Lake Powell (not Plaintiff) was done without Plaintiffs
approval]. (See Page 282, % 60 and Page 295, ^ 119 of the Record). Furthermore,
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"waiver," in Utah, is the "intentional relinquishment of a known right." Barnes v. Wood.
750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988). Furthermore, "[t]o waive a right there must be
an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it." Id. Additionally, "The party's actions or conduct must evince
unequivocally an intent to waive or must be inconsistent with any other intent." Id.
Finally, "[w]hether a right has been waived is generally a question of fact and therefore
we accord considerable deference to the finder of fact's determination." Id. Neither the
trial judge nor the requested Jury has made any finding on this claim for waiver.
The undisputed facts (for purpose of this appeal) on this issue are as follows:
"Despite Defendant Wasatch Marine's agreement at the time of the
December 23, 1998, contract, to allow Plaintiff to test drive the yacht
before taking delivery thereof and before making final payment thereon,
when the yacht arrived at Defendant Wasatch Marine's dealership,
Defendant Wasatch Marine, through Stuart Nelson, demanded full payment
of the balance owing in advance of taking delivery.
Defendant Wasatch Marine, through Stuart Nelson, refused to allow
Plaintiff to take the yacht out onto Utah Lake for a test drive until Plaintiff
made full payment of the balance owing.
As a result, on or about May 10, 1999, and prior to any test drive or
delivery of the yacht, Plaintiff caused to be paid to Defendant Wasatch
Marine the remaining balance owed on the yacht and accessories in the
form of a Deseret Credit Union Check drawn on the funds and account of
said financial institution (rather than Plaintiffs own account) in the sum of
$156,046.33."
2nd Am. Cmpl. ^ 35-37 (Record Page 278). Given that Plaintiff had already provided
Defendant Wasatch Marine with a Deposit of $15,000.00 (Record Page 277, % 27), these
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assertions directly, or by reasonable inference, provide a sufficient basis to show that
there was no intentional relinquishment and that Plaintiff was under duress and that
Defendant Wasatch Marine was in breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing as
plead by Plaintiff. 2nd Am. Cmpl. ^ 136-137 (Record Pages 297). Any such
determination should go to the Jury, as factfinder, where there is any reasonable dispute.
4.

(Cruisers Brief Pg. 6) - Cruisers asserts that Plaintiff only found one

problem during the test drive on Utah Lake on May 20, 1999 (the lift mechanism for
raising the yacht's engines), that Wasatch Marine agreed to immediately repair the
problem, and that following this test drive, Plaintiff "signed a 'Motor Vehicle Contract
of Sale' which completed his purchase of the boat." Cruisers asserts that these claims are
supported by Pages 279, 280-281, and 67 of the Record.
Correct Record Statement (Omitted Facts Shed New Light on These Claims):
It is true that Plaintiff has asserted that, "During the test drive, the mechanism for
raising the yacht's engines malfunctioned' and that "the outdrives could not be raised
remotely as they were designed to be, and had to be hot-wired." 2nd Am. Cmpl. f 45
(Record Page 279). An important factor omitted by Cruisers was that, despite Plaintiffs
concerns over the outdrives, Wasatch Marine represented to Plaintiff that "the
malfunction involving the inability to raise them was a very minor problem resulting
from a loose wire, was the only problem the yacht had, and that once repaired, would
result in a yacht without defects." 2nd Am. Cmpl. \ 46 (Record Page 279). Plaintiff later
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learned this representation to have been false and that the problem was not a minor
problem at all ~ it required that all of the gears and wiring be replaced. 2nd Am. Cmpl. %
55 (Record Page 281). At Plaintiffs insistence, Wasatch Marine represented to Plaintiff
that Plaintiff

<(

could have another test drive on Utah lake prior to delivery of the yacht to

Lake Powell for the plannedBoudfamily vacation around Memorial Day'' 2nd Am.
Cmpl. IT 47 (Record Page 280).
While it is true that Plaintiff did, under duress and based upon misrepresentations,
cause the "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale" to be signed, Cruisers has omitted important
details relating to the circumstances surrounding its execution. As previously identified,
at the time of the test drive of the yacht on Utah Lake on May 20, 1999, Plaintiff had
already paid for the yacht in full, as Wasatch Marine had demanded prior to permitting a
test drive (despite an earlier promise to permit a test drive prior to payment of the balance
in excess of the $15,000.00 Deposit). 2nd Am. Cmpl. ] 37 (Record Page 278). Prior to
the full payment by Plaintiff and the test drive on May 20, 1999, Wasatch Marine had
also represented to Plaintiff, "that the yacht had been inspected by Defendant Wasatch
Marine and was in top condition'' 2nd Am. Cmpl. ^[39 (Record Page 278). Prior to the
test drive, a detailed contract in writing for the purchase of the yacht had already been
entered into between Plaintiff and Wasatch Marine on December 23, 1998. 2nd Am.
Cmpl f 23-28 (Record Pages 276-277). Plaintiff has clearly plead the following
additional facts and circumstances surrounding the signing of the Motor Vehicle
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Contract of Sale:
"After the test drive on Utah Lake, on the highway just outside of
the gate to the boat park, as the Boud family was driving out of the parking
lot behind them, Defendant Wasatch Marine, through Stuart Nelson,
suddenly stopped the Boud's and presented Mr. Joseph Boud with a 'Motor
Vehicle Contract of Sale' claiming that Mr. Joseph Boud had to sign it.
Mr. Joseph Boud responded that he did not want to consider signing
any such document until the yacht was working properly.
Defendant Wasatch Marine, through Stuart Nelson, insisted that the
'Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale' was a standard sales contract, that any
mechanical problem with the yacht was minor but would not be fixed until
Mr. Boud signed, promised that a test drive would occur before delivery of
the yacht to Lake Powell, and unduly pressured Mr. Joseph Boud to sign it
without providing Mr. Boud with time to read the document thoroughly in
a proper location not located on the highway and despite the fact that
Plaintiff had already paid in full for the yacht and that the parties already
had a valid contract.
Plaintiff did not negotiate with Defendant Wasatch Marine
concerning the terms of the document entitled 'Motor Vehicle Contract of
Sale' based upon the representations of Defendant Wasatch Marine,
through Stuart Nelson, as to the nature of the document, due to the location
and circumstances, and Plaintiffs reliance upon the representations of
Defendant Wasatch Marine and its employees, as set forth in the preceding
five (5) paragraphs.
Wanting to test drive the yacht before accepting delivery of the
yacht, reasonably believing that only minor repairs were needed and that
Defendant Wasatch Marine would not repair it nor allow Plaintiff to test
drive it unless Mr. Joseph Boud signed, and based upon the representations
of Defendant Wasatch Marine, through Stuart Nelson, concerning the
document, Mr. Joseph Boud for Plaintiff, under duress, signed the 'Motor
Vehicle Contract of Sale' without reading it.
Had Plaintiff and the Boud family know the true extent of the
damage to the yacht, as the subsequently learned, Plaintiff and Mr. Boud
would not have signed the 'Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale.'
-6-

Neither Plaintiff nor the Boud family received any consideration,
benefit, or thing of value for the signing of the 'Motor Vehicle Contract of
Sale' additional to that to which Plaintiff was already entitled."
2nd Am. CmpL % 48-54 (Record Pages 280-281). These facts provide a sufficient basis
for the identified Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale to be voided based upon tortious
misrepresentation, duress, lack of consideration, bad faith and unfair dealing, mistake,
and unconscionability. Given the circumstances of it being presented to Plaintiff for
signature on the highway when there already was a written contract signed by the parties
with no additional benefit to Plaintiff, where Wasatch Marine already had all of the
funds, and where Wasatch Marine had represented that repairs would not be made
without execution of the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, it would be particularly
appropriate for this document to be invalidated based upon unconscionability, a cause of
action specifically asserted by Plaintiff. 2nd Am. Cmpl. ^ 108G and 138 (Record Pages
290-291 and 297).
5.

(Cruisers Brief Pg. 7) - Cruisers asserts that, "After completing repairs

Wasatch Marine delivered the yacht to lake Powell as requested by Mr. Boud, on or
about May 27, 1999" claiming that this statement is supported by Pages 69 and 283 of
the Record.
Correct Record Statement (A Direct Contradiction):
"When Mrs. Boud called Defendant Wasatch Marine, mid-day on or
about May 26th or 27th of 1999, she was told that Stuart Nelson was due to
arrive at Bullfrog at noon with the yacht and wanted to know where
Plaintiff and the Bouds were going to store the yacht.
-7-

The employee to whom Mrs. Boud spoke, after being questioned
about the test drive, indicated that he did not know anything about it.
Plaintiff and the Bouds were upset that without Plaintiffs
authorization or prior inspection, Defendant Wasatch Marine delivered the
yacht to Lake Powell, against Plaintiffs specific instructions and the
agreement that there was to be another test drive on Utah Lake before
Plaintiff took delivery."
2nd Am. Cmpl. T| 58-60 (Record Pages 281-282). Clearly, the Record, which must be
interpreted in favor of Plaintiff on appeal, establishes that the delivery of the yacht to
Lake Powell was not requested by Mr. Boud or otherwise authorized by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was fully expecting a second test drive at Utah Lake prior to Plaintiff potentially
taking delivery of the yacht. Furthermore, the problems experienced at the Utah Lake
test drive required replacement of all of the gears and wiring. 2nd Am. Cmpl. ^f 55
(Record Page 281). These repairs were never properly "completed" during any test by
Plaintiff. 2nd Am. Cmpl. f 62A and 70B (Record Pages 282-283).
6.

(Cruisers Brief Pg. 7) - Cruisers asserts that, "Throughout the proceedings

below, aside from the repairable problems with the yacht, Plaintiff's primary complaint
about the 'performance' of the yacht has been that the boat will not plane at a speed of
20 miles per hour with a full load and thus, its is not able to tow younger water skiers at
this speed." No record citation is provided for this claim.
Correct Record Statement (A Direct Contradiction):
As previously identified in the present Brief, the initial problem experienced with
the yacht required the gears and wiring to be replaced. Unfortunately, as previously
-8-

asserted, the problem with the gears was never corrected during any of Plaintiff s tests of
the yacht. While Plaintiff acknowledges that the planing of the yacht at a speed of 20
miles per hour with a full load is one of Plaintiff s claims, the ongoing problems with the
gear performance and problems with engine overheating, generator malfunction and
smoke, problematic air conditioning, latches for child safety on doors, anchor
malfunction, and alarms sounding were also of great importance to Plaintiff. With
regards to the asserted express warranty at issue, the engine, electrical, and gear problems
are asserted to have directly affected the promised "performance."
This poor performance is aptly set forth in the record as follows:
"Each time Plaintiff and Plaintiffs agents went to the time and
expense of traveling to Lake Powell to use the yacht, it manifested different
and substantial defects and mechanical malfunctions, would not plane at
slow speeds for towing children water skiers, as promised, and was
generally not fit or useable for pleasure boating, or use for transportation
and accommodations while on vacation."
2nd Am. Cmpl. Tf 75 (Record Page 285). The Record also contains other claims as to the
severity of the defects encountered and asserted by Plaintiff, including the following
assertion:
"Following the second repair attempt of the yacht by Defendant
Wasatch Marine's mechanics [at Lake Powell], Defendant Wasatch
Marine, through Stuart Nelson, called to inform Plaintiff that the mechanics
felt current conditions were serious, that Defendant Wasatch Marine agreed
with Plaintiff that Plaintiffs complaints were valid, that Defendant
Wasatch Marine apologized profusely for the defects concerning the yacht
and the burden they were to Plaintiff and to the Boud family, and said the
yacht's defects required return of the yacht to Salt Lake City, Utah, for
more substantial service and repairs."
-9-

2nd Am Cmpl. If 72 (Record Pages 284-285).
7.

(Cruisers Brief Pg. 7-8) - Cruisers asserts that, "Plaintiff has not

complained about the 'performance' of the yacht at higher speeds." No record citation is
provided for this claim.
Correct Record Statement (A Direct Contradiction):
As previously identified in the present Brief, such an assertion is just not true. For
instance, Plaintiff has consistently complained of gear problems (which are not limited to
just lower speeds). Additionally, the engines have experienced overheating and the yacht
has had generator trouble.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff, in the initial Brief, has aptly set forth the basis why this Court should
find that the language and photograph contained on Page 30 of the Cruisers Yachts
Promotional Material (attached to Plaintiffs initial Brief as "Appendix C") could be
held to be an express warranty by a jury of reasonable persons. Plaintiff, in conformity
with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, will attempt to avoid repetition of prior argument
and focus this argument solely on points raised by Cruisers Yachts.
A. Standard of Review for Determination of Express Warranty and Summary Judgment
Under Point I of Cruisers Yachts' Argument, Cruisers has stated that Plaintiff
argues "that a trial judge's 'specialized knowledge of the law' disqualifies him or her
from applying" the "reasonable person" standard used to determine whether an express
-10-

warranty has been made. (See Cruisers Brief Page 11). This is not what Plaintiff stated.
(See Plaintiffs Brief Page 25). Plaintiff recognizes that trial courts may issue Summary
Judgment on express warranties when it finds that reasonable minds would not differ as
to the existence or absence of an express warranty. Plaintiff simply made the valid point
that express warranties are to be determined based upon a "reasonable person" standard
and not, for example, the "reasonable judge" or "reasonable trial lawyer" standard, where
such professionals are likely to be more sophisticated with regards to the law. Plaintiff
further made the point that a Jury, as requested by Plaintiff in the relevant Complaint, is a
suitable forum ideally composed of "reasonable persons" and that this decision should be
made by the Jury unless there can be no doubt that reasonable minds would not differ.
Cruisers has stated that, "Plaintiffs self-serving declaration that reasonable
minds could differ on the interpretation of the facts in this case does not make it so"
(See Cruisers Brief Page 11). Cruisers then proceeds in its Brief to take essentially the
same tenor claiming the trial court made the "correct conclusion" by not finding an
express warranty and issuing Summary Judgment in favor of Cruisers. The decision of
the trial court and the parties' respective positions carry no weight at this stage in the
appeal since entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law and the Supreme
Court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.
The review of the issues is de novo with facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Glover v. Boy Scouts of America. 923
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P.2d 1383, 1384-1385 (Utah 1996).
B. The GAF Standard for Determining Reasonableness
Cruisers Yachts, like Plaintiff, has acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court, in
Rawson v. Conover. 2001 UT 24 § 55, 20 P.3d 876, has recently reaffirmed the process
for determining the existence of an express warranty as follows:
"§ 55 A reasonable-person standard is used to determine whether the
language of the seller is an affirmation of fact, promise, or description as
opposed to the seller's opinion or commendation. See State Div. of
Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 315 (Utah 1988). "'If it is
reasonable to conclude that a reasonable person would have ventured into
the transaction on the basis of a particular statement," an express warranty
was made."' Id. (quoting 3 R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code, § 2-313:50, at 44 (3d ed.1983))."
Cruisers Yachts also acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court has given
guidance for determining "reasonableness" with regards to whether an express warranty
has been made in State By and Through Div. of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760
P.2d 310, 315 (Utah 1988) (quoting in part 3 R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code, § 2-313:50, at 44 (3d ed. 1983)), which states,
"An affirmation of fact, a promise, or a description of the goods must be
judged objectively against the meaning that a reasonable person would
have taken from the statement . . . In determining reasonableness, a court
should consider such factors, among others, as c (l) the ability of the buyer
to see and understand for himself, (2) the vagueness of the statement, and
(3) the incredibility of the statement.'"
(Underline Emphasis Added)
Plaintiff agrees with Cruisers that this is the appropriate standard of review.
Cruisers, in its Brief, limited its review to the three enumerated factors listed in GAF and
-12-

studiously ignored discussing the "other factors" provided for in GAF, some of which
were addressed by Plaintiff in Plaintiffs initial Brief -Money Expended, Hedging,
Vendor Assumption ofFact Upon Which Buyer is Ignorant, Determinable
Representations, Surrounding Brochure Information, and Seller Bears the Risk.
1.

Consumer's ability to see and understand for himself
Cruisers makes two extremely weak arguments to support its claim that Plaintiff

had the ability to see and understand for itself. First, Cruisers claims that Plaintiff is "an
experienced buyer of multiple boats" and had previously been a customer of Wasatch
Marine. No Record citation provided. A review of the Record shows that,
Mr. Joseph Boud had previously purchased a boat from Defendant
Wasatch Marine and believed the Defendant Wasatch Marine to be
knowledgeable in the sale and operation of yachts of the type in question.
(Underline Emphasis Added)
2nd Am. CmpL f 7 (Record Page 273). It is upon the purchase of the yacht at issue and
one prior boat that Cruisers makes its claim that Plaintiff is "an experienced buyer of
multiple boats." If the stakes were not so high, such a claim would be laughable. The
only definition for the word "experienced" in THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 314 (1st
ed. 1978), defines "experienced" as "skillful in a particular field through experience"
Involvement in two boat purchases - one being the yacht at issue - is not a sufficient
basis to qualify Plaintiff as "an experienced buyer of multiple boats." This is particularly
true where Cruisers then proceeds to make claims such as, (<Boud clearly knew the world
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of boat purchases and had the experience and ability to evaluate the statements in the
sales brochure for himself" (Cruisers Brief Page 15). Such claims continue throughout
Cruisers' Brief. Plaintiff did not even see the yacht (except in the promotional materials)
until after he had signed a contract and paid a $15,000.00 deposit. Furthermore, Plaintiff
was not permitted to go for a test drive until the balance had been paid in full (despite
earlier promises by Wasatch Marine).
The second asserted "point" which Cruisers uses as a basis to assert that Plaintiff
had the ability to see and understand for himself is its claim that Plaintiff insisted on a
test drive of the yacht as a condition of purchase. Plaintiff does not dispute that a
satisfactory test drive was a condition of the purchase of the yacht. What Plaintiff does
dispute is the claim by Cruisers that Plaintiff voluntarily abandoned or waived this claim.
See Disputed Fact No. 3, Pages 2-4 of the present Brief for Plaintiffs position.
2.

Vagueness of the Statement
Plaintiff does not dispute the general rule that the more specific the statement, the

more likely it is to be determined to be an express warranty. Plaintiff does dispute that
this factor is determinative and functions independent of all other GAF factors. It is
Plaintiffs position that this factor must be considered in conjunction with the other
factors and the surrounding circumstances. Plaintiff believes that the photograph and
statements on Page 30 of the Sales Brochure (attached to Plaintiffs initial Brief as
"Appendix C") are sufficiently definite to be susceptible to the formation of an express
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warranty, despite claims to the contrary by Cruisers. In support of this assertion,
Plaintiff, in the initial Brief, has referred this Court to Summers v. Provo Foundry &
Machine Co., 178 P. 916 (Utah 1919). This Utah case is the case most similar to
Plaintiffs claims identified by either party. Despite its age, this case is good law [though
based upon the substantial similar predecessor to the Utah Commercial Code] and has
not been overruled. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "the statement that
the car would do whatever any other Super-Six would do as also amounting to an
express warranty, and not mere 'seller's talk,' or an expression of opinion." Id. at 917.
In its Brief, Cruisers, quite naturally (since it does not favor its position), has omitted any
reference to this case. Instead, Cruisers has spewed out case law, such as Hirschberg
Optical Co. v. Dalton. Nye & Cannon Co.. 27 P.83 (Utah Terr. 1891), supporting the
proposition that Utah recognizes "Puffing" or "Seller's Talk." This claim is not disputed
by Plaintiff. Plaintiff does, however, assert that a seller does not have the "privilege to
lie his head off" PROSSER, LAWOFTORTS, § 109 at 723 (4th ed. 1971). Furthermore,
such talk must be "kept within reasonable bounds" and should not be "a positive
affirmation of a specific fact affecting quality, so as to be an express warranty"
Hirschberg at 83.
This was what occurred in Summers and what occurred with regards to the yacht
at issue. Cruisers unqualified, written statement represented that the yacht had the "best
performance and cruising accommodations in its class" and "superior handling." These
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statements were immediately below a photograph of the yacht moving at a good clip and
apparently consistent with the "performance" claims.
Cruisers' citation of a Utah stock case is of little use in comparison to Summers.
Likewise, Cruisers seems to focus the heart of its argument on a Texas case, Autohaus,
Inc. v. Aguilar. 794 SW.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), which seems to stand for the
proposition that statements comparing one product to another claiming superiority cannot
be warranties. Such an assertion seems to fly in the face of Summers, as well as other
cases around the country like Lovington Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 642
P.2d 167, 170 (N.M. 1982), 97 N.M. 564, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 522 [representation that
a vaccine was superior to the product then being used by the buyer] and Federal Signal
Corp. v. Safety Factors. Inc.. 886 P.2d 172, 178 (Wash. 1994), 125 Wn.2d 413, 25
U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 765 [where the Court held that the alleged verbal representation that
Night Warrior light towers were comparable to and of higher quality than TPME model,
if proved on remand, could be an express warranty]. The express warranties claimed by
Plaintiff are sufficiently explicit to convey a distinct, factual representation to the
reasonable person.
Cruisers, in Pages 21-22 of its Brief, claims that Plaintiff has misstated that sales
opinions must be labeled as such, that Plaintiff has failed to address the GAF factors, and
that Plaintiffs Brief contains "a smattering of cases from around the country" which
"create a patchwork of 'factors'" which it seems to feel would not be considered or
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accepted by this Court and which it claims contain little guidance. Plaintiff did, in fact,
specifically respond to each of the three enumerated "factors" under the GAF test. (See
Pages 29-36 of Plaintiff s Initial Brief). Each of the remaining claims is to some degree
interrelated in Plaintiffs suggestion of appropriate "other factors" for this Court to
consider, as provided for in GAF. One of these factors was "hedging." Plaintiff never
claimed that an opinion had to be stated as such. Plaintiff, in its initial Brief, has simply
provided Utah case law indicating that where an opinion is not stated as such, that is one
factor this Court may consider. See Hirschberg Optical Co. v. Dalton. Nye & Cannon
Co.. 27 P. 83, 83-84 (1891). See Also 1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-4 (4th ed. 1995) [this same treatise also recognizes (1) the

relative knowledge of the seller and buyer, as set forth in Plaintiffs initial Brief as
"Vendor Assumption of Fact Upon Which Buyer is Ignorant"; (2) the seriousness of the
plaintiffs injury, as set forth in Plaintiffs initial Brief as "Money Expended"; (3) a
written statement is less likely to pass as a puff than an oral one, as set forth in Plaintiffs
initial Brief as "Surrounding Brochure Information" and "Plaintiffs Ability to See and
Understand"]. Clearly, "other factors" than the three specifically enumerated by GAF are
appropriately considered by other appellate courts, by authors of recognized treatises, and
should be considered by this Court where these "other factors" provide some
understanding of the totality of the circumstances under which the warranty is claimed..
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3.

The Incredibility of the Statement
Cruisers makes essentially three claims under this prong. Plaintiff has already

addressed Cruiser's flawed contention that Plaintiff is "an experienced buyer of multiple
boats" in Pages 13-14 of the present Brief. Cruisers' second claim is that the nature of
the statements would cause a "reasonable person similarly situated" to see them as "Sales
Talk" and not a warranty and a restatement of its claim that they are too vague to form a
warranty. This claim has been adequately addressed by Plaintiff in Page 36 of Plaintiff s
Initial Brief. The third claim is an apparent assertion that statements as to product quality
in a brochure cannot be relied upon. This assertion is directly contradicted and
adequately addressed in Page 30 of Plaintiff s Initial Brief. Such statements can be
warranties. Furthermore, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code § 13-1114(2)(b), specifically provides that a knowing or intentional misrepresentation that the
u

subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or

moder is a deceptive act or practice. (See Page 4 of Plaintiff s Initial Brief).
C. "Part of the Basis of the Bargain " Test fPages 23-24 Cruisers' Brief)
Plaintiff has clearly established and adequately briefed the fact that the identified
statements and photograph from Page 30 of the Sales Brochure (attached to Plaintiffs
initial Brief as "Appendix C") were part of the basis of bargain of Plaintiff s purchase
of the yacht. (See Pages 40-42, Plaintiffs Initial Brief). Cruisers has failed to provided
any directed rebuttal on this issue other than to claim that the sales brochure was too
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general or vague (its common theme) to form part of the basis of the bargain.
Specifically, Cruisers asserts that "class" is too vague a term to be enforceable. It is a
well-established principle that "[t]he ordinary meaning of contract terms is often best
determined through standard, non-legal dictionaries." Warburton v. Virgina Beach
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1995). THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY 168 (1st ed. 1978), defines "class" in the first definition as "a number of
persons or things forming a group by reason of common traits or attributes." It is
logical to presume that a "reasonable person" would have a similar understanding of this
word. The "class" itself would be presumptively knowable since they would be yachts
containing "common traits or attributes" to the yacht at issue. Plaintiff, contrary to
another of Cruisers' claims in this section, has asserted that the handling was poor. (See
Page 44, Plaintiffs Initial Brief).
D. Cruisers' Assertion that any Express Warranties are Disclaimed by Reference to
Limited Warranty on the Back of the Sales Brochure
See Disputed Facts No. 1 and 2, Pages 1-2 of the present Brief, which clearly
establish in the record, for purposes of this appeal, that Plaintiff was not told about any
limited warranty by the dealer, as Cruisers claims. Furthermore, there is no indication in
the record that Plaintiff ever reviewed the fine print notation on the back side of the Sales
Brochure referencing a limited warranty. As this Court has previously held, it is the
policy of law to look with disfavor upon semiconcealed or obscure self-protective
provisions in contract prepared by one party, which other party is not likely to notice.
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Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976). Plaintiff has
disputed having agreed to any "limited" warranty. (See Page 233 of the Record).
Certainly, the Sales Brochure, referenced on the back cover, does not state that Plaintiffs
claims are solely and exclusively under any limited warranty. As a result, it is
appropriate that Cruisers' Express Warranties, as provided on Page 30 of the Sales
Brochure, be construed harmoniously with any other warranty ("comprehensive" or
otherwise) available to Plaintiff on the yacht, as provided for in Utah Code § 70A-2316(1). As a result, Plaintiff should receive the benefits of both and is likewise entitled
to make his claims for Rejection and/or Revocation in the alternative to a claim for
damages for breach of warranty.
It appears that Cruisers would improperly have this Court believe that a "limited
warranty" (even if it does not fail of its essential purpose and is upheld as valid and
conspicuous) may eliminate Plaintiffs right under the U.C.C. to Reject or Revoke
Acceptance of the goods. Plaintiff has clearly plead these claims and that Cruisers and
the dealer have failed to comply. 2nd Am. Cmpl. 194. 119. 134, and 13575 (Record
Pages 288, 295, and 297). This argument has been soundly rejected by the vast majority
of all Courts which have considered it, including this Court and the United States
Supreme Court.1 In Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, et aL 167 P. 663, 665

1

Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, et aL 167 P. 663,665 (Utah
1917); East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval. Inc.. 476 U.S. 858, 872,
106 S.Ct. 2295, 2303 (U.S. 1986); Murray v. D & J Motor Co.. Inc.. 958 P.2d 823
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(Utah 1917), for instance, this Court held that, " Tor a breach of warranty the vendee
has the right to rescind the contract and recover back the purchase price, or he may
retain the vehicle and hold the vendor for his damages'" Id. (quoting BERRY, LAW
AUTOMOBILES, § 226).

E. Cruisers' Assertion that Plaintiff Waived or Disclaimed Any Express Warranty
In Pages 25-28 of its Brief, Cruisers mistakenly claims that even if an express
warranty was created by the Sales Brochure, the warranty would no longer be available
based upon waiver and the disclaimer of the warranty. Cruisers' claim that "because
Boud insisted on a test cruise before paying for and accepting the boat, he waived any
express warranty since he clearly wanted to be the judge of whether it exhibited 'superb
handling1 or offered the lbestperformance and cruising accommodations in its class'" is
just plain hogwash. Cruisers has not cited any case law or statutory authority for such an
assertion. To so find, would be to invalidate the warranty on every new car based upon a
consumer's test drive. Furthermore, Cruiser's "Red Herring" argument on "mutuality of

(Okla.Civ.App. Div.4 1998); Seekings v. GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210 (Arizona
1981); Beneficial Commercial Corp. v. CottrelL 688 P.2d 1254 (Montana 1984);
Shelton v. Farkas. 635 P.2d 1109 (Wash.App. 1981); Page v. Dobbs Mobile Bav. Inc.,
599 So.2d 38 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992); Blankenship v. Northtown Ford Inc.. 420 N.E.2d
167(Ill.App. 1981); O'Neal Ford. Inc. v. Earley. 681 S.W.2d414 (Ark.App. 1985);
Frantz Lithographic Service, Inc. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 38 U.C.C. Reporting Service
485 (U.S. Dist.Ct, E.D. PA 1984); Barrv & Sewall Indus. Supply v. Metal-Prep. 912
F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1990); See also Manning G. Warren, The Effect of Warranty
Disclaimers on Revocation ofAcceptance Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 37
Ala.L.Rev. 307 (1986).
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assent" is for the most part irrelevant since this Court has held that "a consumer can
recover for breach of an express warranty despite a lack of privity" with a manufacturer.
GAF at 315. See Also Disputed Fact No. 3, Pages 2-4 of the present Brief.
As to Cruiser's second argument, that the express warranty was invalidated by the
execution of the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale (the second written contract the dealer
insisted Plaintiff execute on the highway when the dealer had the full purchase price,
misrepresented the condition of the yacht, and asserted that it would not repair the yacht
until the document was signed), this argument is also without merit. See Disputed Fact
No. 4, Pages 4-7 of the present Brief, which sets forth the circumstances surrounding its
execution. This Court has clearly established that an unconscionable agreement is not
enforceable. Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). This Court has also held
that while a party generally has a duty to read and understand terms of contract before
signing it, this duty is obviated when a party's failure to read agreement result from
procedurally unconscionable behavior by a party in a stronger bargaining position. Sosa
v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah 1996). While not relating to medical surgery in this
case, the circumstances surrounding the execution areripefor a finding of procedural
unconscionability. Plaintiff was not presented with the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale
(despite a previously existing written contract) until after the yacht's purchase price of
over $150,000.00 had been paid in full. Likewise, the printed document was presented
to Plaintiff by the dealer, Wasatch Marine, on the highway exiting Utah Lake after a test
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drive on the lake where the yacht had experienced mechanical problems. The dealer was
in a significantly stronger bargaining position given that it had already been paid in full,
given that it had represented it would not fix the yacht unless the document was signed,
given that the document was explained without disclosing the disclaimer of express
warranties under the Sales Brochure, given that the dealer had not explained or offered to
Plaintiff that Plaintiff could have its money back, and given that it had represented that
the mechanical problem was minor (which turned out not to be the case). To paraphrase
this Court's comments in Sosa,
"Under these circumstances, [it cannot be concluded] that the [Motor
Vehicle Contract of Sale] was negotiated in a fair manner and that the
parties had a real and voluntary meeting of the minds. Nor can [it be
concluded] that [Plaintiff] had a meaningful choice with respect to signing
the agreement."
Id. In conjunction with the procedural unconscionability, the dealer has placed itself and
Cruisers in a position to attempt to disclaim the dealer's verbal express warranties and
the express warranties contained in the Cruisers' Promotional Literature relating to the
yacht. This could potentially evicerate Plaintiffs ability to enforce the original contract
and terms and is also substantively unconscionable.
Contrary to Cruiser's assertion, Plaintiff takes the position that the facts set forth
in this section and in the Disputed Fact No. 4, Pages 4-7 of this Brief, also qualify as
duress, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious and deceptive
misrepresentation, failure of consideration, and mistake. This Court should unwind the
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"Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale" (the 2nd Contract) if only for mistake since the record
clearly demonstrates (when view in the light most favorable to Plaintiff) that the dealer
represented to Plaintiff "that any mechanical problem with the yacht was minor but
would not be fixed until [The Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale] was signed' and that
Plaintiff relied upon this assertion as a basis for executing the document and would not
have executed it had Plaintiff known of the true extent of the damage to the yacht (which
damage was to continue in some form throughout each attempt to use it). 2nd Am. Cmpl.
If 50. 54. and 75 (Record Pages 280-281, and 285).
In addition to those arguments already presented in an attempt to disclaim the
express warranties provided by the Cruisers Promotional Literature, Plaintiff has
specifically claimed that the giving of express warranties and then the attempt to void or
dishonor them through a limited warranty and improper attempts to disclaim them are
violative of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code §§ 13-11-4 and 13-11-5.
2nd Am. Cmpl. ^ 109B-D (Record Page 193). This claim also played a central issue
in GAR which claim this Court ultimately upheld. See GAF at 314. Another basis for
not finding for Cruisers under any Limited Warranty, is that the Limited Warranty, itself
(Addendum D to Cruiser's Brief), states on its face that the "LIMITED WARRANTY CAN
BE ACTIVATED ONLY BY SUBMITTING THE LIMITED WARRANTY
REGISTRATION CARD' TO CRUISERS YACHT WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE
DATE OF PURCHASE." This Limited Warranty, even if it were otherwise valid, must
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fail since the Record clearly establishes that Plaintiff never activated or caused it to be
activated by sending in the "Limited Warranty Registration Card." 2nd Am. Cmpl. % 9799 (Record Pages 188-189).
F. Plaintiffs Claims for UCSPA Violations and Negligent Misrepresentation
Plaintiffs claims on these issues are sufficiently briefed in its initial Brief.
Plaintiff would simply point out that Cruisers has continued to make unsubstantiated and
inaccurate claims that Plaintiff was "an experienced boat buyer," that Plaintiff read the
entire Sales Brochure (record only establishes Page 30 of the Brochure), and that
Plaintiff was told about a limited warranty in its response in this area.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff specifically requests that this Court reverse paragraphs two and three
under "Conclusions ofLaw" of the trial court's Final Order (Record Page 447 and Page
3 of " Appendix A" to Plaintiffs initial Brief), as well as reversing the "ORDER OF
DISMISSAL" contained in the trial court's Final Order and reinstating Plaintiffs claims
against Cruisers Yachts. Plaintiff also requests any other beneficial relief which this
Court might choose to award.
SUBMITTED This / / r \ i y of July, 2001

JON. H. ROGI
lorney for Appellant
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